

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

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
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10/31/83

Date

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



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October 28, 1983

TO: P - Mr. Eagleburger
S/P - Mr. Bosworth
ARA - Mr. Motley
ARA - Mr. Johnstone
ARA/CEN - Mr. Smith

FROM: S/SE - Richard B. Stone ^{fs}

SUBJECT: Proposed Plan and Scenario for Next Trip
to Region

Attached for your review is proposed plan and scenario for Stone trip to Central America and Colombia that could begin as early as November 6. I will discuss this idea with you and the Secretary early next week.

Attachments:

Two, as stated

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NEXT STEPS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN DIALOGUE

The Grenada military operation temporarily removes Lebanon and Nicaragua from the spotlight. Yet, cumulatively, the Lebanese, Nicaraguan and Grenadan engagements reinforce our critics' caricature that we seek only military solutions. Countervailing activism on the political/diplomatic front at this time would serve us well -- by re-establishing perceived balance in our policy and demonstrating that we are using our military efforts for political purpose and diplomatic leverage.

Renewed high-profile diplomatic activity in Central America could take two directions:

- A. The beginning of intensified direct US dialogue with Nicaragua under the rubric of expanded facilitation of the Contadora process. The dialogue would seek to perfect the anti-subversion undertakings presented by Foreign Minister D'Escoto, October 20, and to expand discussion to cover key questions omitted from the Nicaraguan drafts such as arms imports, foreign military presence, and democratization. On the latter, we would press strongly for a Sandinista-contra dialogue on ending fighting in exchange for significant democratization. We would offer either ourselves, a prominent Nicaraguan, or a Contadora President, (i.e., Betancur or de la Espriella) as an intermediary to the contras, should Managua once again decline to deal with the contras directly; and
- B. A push for revitalized Salvadoran internal dialogue, including Salvadoran tabling of a Peace Commission written electoral negotiating offer to the FDR/FMLN. The written offer would be communicated through our good offices. A pre-meeting by me with the Left to push them to drop or defer the power-sharing issue and to negotiate now on the detailed written election offer would be urged.

Moves on the political/diplomatic track in Central America would not only reduce our vulnerability on the Grenada issue, but could be used to lever favorable results on contra funding -- i.e., in exchange for continued Congressional funding, we and the contras would agree to "negotiate" with the Sandinistas.

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Subject to your approval, I propose another trip to Central America beginning on or about November 6 to implement the first phases of the above plan of action, both as to the Salvador dialogue and a preliminary meeting in Managua. I would, however, propose to reserve the announcement of the beginning of Nicaraguan "negotiations" to use as leverage in and with the Senate on contra funding.

A scenario of the trip is attached.

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Scenario for Stone Trip to Central America

1. First Stop - San Salvador

Purpose: Obtain agreement from GOES to have Peace Commission table already-prepared written negotiating offer on elections. Seek authorization for Stone pre-meeting with Left to facilitate FDR/FMLN - Peace Commission contact for discussion of written electoral offer. Alternatively, obtain Salvadoran authorization to transmit written negotiating offer to FDR/FMLN through good offices of Costa Rican President Monge.

2. Second Stop - Managua

Purpose: Ask Sandinistas to explain full details and scope of their proposals on the four draft treaties delivered by D'Escoto, October 20. Ask for their positions on democratization and other areas not included in their four proposals. Refrain from substantive response and indicate that, after further consideration, we will be in touch with them shortly.

3. Third Stop - San Jose

Purpose: (a) Arrange for* Stone pre-meeting with FDR/FMLN or, alternatively, provide Salvadoran written negotiating offer to President Monge for onward transmittal to FDR/FMLN; (b) Hold meeting with representatives of all major contra groups to receive proposal for dialogue with FSLN on peace and democratization. (An alternative site could be Bogota.)* (and, if possible, hold)

4. Fourth Stop - Bogota

Purpose: Report to President Betancur on meetings with Sandinistas and with contras. Request that President Betancur go to Managua to propose a discussion package with the Sandinistas: continued Contadora talks, direct dialogue with the US on all security measures in order to facilitate Contadora, plus dialogue with armed and unarmed opposition on internal democratization with Betancur acting as intermediary to anti-Sandinistas. Indicate that if Sandinistas accept whole package, Stone will return to Washington urging that USG agree to

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package. Propose to meet Betancur after his Managua trip in Panama.

5. Fifth Stop - Panama

Purpose: Await Betancur return from Managua and meet with him (perhaps on Contadora Island) to get read-out on Sandinista receptivity to negotiations package.

6. Return to Washington

Purpose: Report to Congress on Sandinista receptivity to, or rejection of, comprehensive negotiations offer. Use prospect of comprehensive or partial talks with Nicaraguans as additional justification for maintaining contra funding and for FY84 supplemental.

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